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NOTES
AGENCY-RATIFICATION OF AN
UNAUTHORIZED ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of ratification is often employed by the courts to
bind a purported principal to an unauthorized act done in his
behalf. Because it has been applied primarily in two distinct
situations, two branches of the doctrine have come to be recog-
nized, namely, express and implied ratification.
Express ratification comprehends those cases in which the
principal voluntarily becomes a party to the obligation.' Illus-
trative of such a ratification is a South Carolina case in which
a clerk endorsed a note for his principal without the latter's
authority; upon being informed of the act the principal replied,
"It is all right."2 Liability in such instances is predicated upon
the willingness of the principal to be bound to the agreement.
Implied ratification, on the other hand, is based on conduct of
the principal which is inconsistent with any position other than
a confirmation of the act done in his behalf. The inconsistent
conduct is viewed by the courts as manifesting an affirmation of
the transaction.3 Ratification is implied in order to deny the
principal an advantageous position over the third person con-
tractor. Absent implied ratification, the principal, after discov-
ering the execution of the unauthorized act, could either ratify
or reject depending on whether the transaction subsequently
resulted in profit or loss.
Implied ratification is employed in two fact situations: First,
the principal is considered to have ratified an act done in his
behalf if with full knowledge of the facts he accepts property
which is a consequence of the unauthorized act or retains such
property after he discovers the material facts and before he has
changed his position with respect to the property; second, rati-
fication can be implied from conduct other than the receipt or
retention of property.
Throughout this article the aforementioned classifications
will be developed focusing on the law of South Carolina. Atten-
tion is directed in advance to the fact that while many of the
1. "It is elementary that lack of authority can be supplied by express ratifi-
cation." Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 26, 64 S.E.2d
8,12 (1951).
2. Brown v. Wilson, 45 S.C. 519, 23 S.E. 630 (1896).
3. For an informative coverage of the various categories of ratification, see
Seavey, Ratification by Silence, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 30 (1954).
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propositions of law presented apply equally to express and im-
plied ratification, some relate only to one type. The distinctions
are made whenever applicable. Moreover, express ratification
understandably involves comparatively fewer complexities and,
hence, does not require as detailed treatment.
II. RATmIcATioN GENERALLY
In South Carolina "[r]atification as it relates to the law of
agency [is] defined as the expressed or implied adoption and
confirmation by one person of an act or contract performed or
entered into in his behalf by another who at the time assumed to
act as his agent. Whether or not there has been a ratification
... is usually a question of fact."4
A. Parties
For an unauthorized act to be ratified, the party affirming the
act must have possessed the power to have authorized the act in
the first instance.5 Accordingly an agent may not ratify his own
unauthorized act and thereby bind his principal.8 This does not
prevent the principal, however, from specifically authorizing
the agent to ratify a prior unauthorized act.7 If no principal is
disclosed at the time of the act, the party for whom the agent
intended to act is the one who must affirm the transaction." If
the party making the contract did not intend to do so as agent
for the person claiming or claimed to be the principal, there can
be no ratification. 9
B. Knowledge of Materia Facts
A principal who affirms an unauthorized act, either expressly
or impliedly, must have full knowledge of the material facts at
the time of ratification. 10 South Carolina applies an objective
4. Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 86, 124 S.E.2d 602,
608 (1962); accord, Brazell Bros. Contractors v. Hill, 245 S.C. 69, 138 S.E2d
835 (1964).
5. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 S.E.2d 562
(1939); 7 C.J.S. Associations § 20 (1936).
6. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 161 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Agency § 36 (1936).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 93, comment c. at 242 (1958).
8. Id. § 87.
9. Williams v. Jacobs, 237 S.C. 183, 116 S.E.2d 157 (1960); see Miles v.
Gadsden, 139 S.C. 52, 137 S.E. 204 (1927) (dissenting opinion) ; RESTATEUENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 85 (1958).
10. E.g., Gantt v. Belk-Simpson Co., 172 S.C. 353, 174 S.E. 1 (1934) ; Yaw-
key v. Lowndes, 150 S.C. 493, 148 S.E. 554 (1929) ; Sumter Trust Co. v. Moser,
116 S.C. 446, 107 S.E. 918 (1921).
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test in determining whether the principal possesses such knowl-
edge. In Moore v. Hardaway Contracting Co." the court stated
the South Carolina rule as follows: "[I]n the absence of circum-
stances putting a reasonably prudent man on inquiry ratification
cannot be implied as against a principal who is ignorant of the
facts."'1 2 This implies that ignorance of material facts is not a
defense where the principal intentionally acts without inquiry
under circumstances which would put the proverbial reasonably
prudent man on notice.
C. Acts Capable of Ratification
It is settled that a principal may ratify the voidable acts of
his agent' 8 and such ratification may be express or implied.14
A principal may not, however, ratify a transaction declared by
positive law or public policy to be illegal and void ab initio.'5
In such a case no subsequent ratification can give the act force
or effect.'
Liability for an act such as a tort, however, may be incurred
by ratification. Generally, it is not the tort liability itself which
is ratified but rather the agency which imposes the liability for
the tort committed in its course. "Without power to bind P
thereby, A drives P's truck in delivering goods to T, intending
to act as P's servant. While delivering the goods, A negligently
injures B, a stranger, and breaks a window in T's house. With
knowledge of the facts P affirms A's conduct. P is subject to
liability to T and to B."17 South Carolina has applied the doc-
trine of ratification to charge the principal for the tort of his
purported agent in actions for trespass'" and personal injuries' "
and has strongly indicated that it is applicable to an action for
slander.2 0 As was explained in the previous section the princi-
11. 193 S.C. 299, 8 S.E.2d 511 (1940).
12. Id. at 305, 8 S.E.2d at 513.
13. Rice v. Shealy, 71 S.C. 161, 50 S.E. 868 (1905).
14. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E2d 8
(1951).
15. Id. (dictum).
16. 2 C.J.S. Agency § 37 (1936).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 218, illustration No. 1 (1958).
18. Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960) ; Manson v. Demp-
sey, 88 S.C. 193, 70 S.E. 610 (1911).
19. Laughlin v. Southern Pub. Serv. Corp., 83 S.C. 62, 64 S.E. 1010 (1909).
20. Gantt v. Belk-Simpson Co., 172 S.C. 353, 174 S.E. 1 (1934) (dictum);
Hypes v. Southern R.R., 82 S.C. 315, 64 S.E. 395 (1909) (dictum). In these
cases the court discussed ratification but decided that the doctrine was irrelevant
since the acts were committed within the scope of the employment or agency.
[Vol. 19
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pal's knowledge of the tort prior to ratification is a prerequisite
to recovery.
D. Ratification of Sealed Instruments
Since South Carolina still requires a seal on certain docu-
ments, an express ratification of such documents requires an act
of equal dignity. "If the purpose to be effected by the writing
could only have been accomplished by a deed, then its execution
by an agent must be ratified by the deed of the principal, if no
previous power, by deed, authorized the act in his name. '21
This formality is not required, however, in the case of an unau-
thorized sealed paper of a partnership; in such a case an express
oral ratification is possible.
22
Of particular importance is the inapplicability of the require-
ment of sealed ratification to option contracts involving real
estate. Inasmuch as no seal is required on an option contract of
real property, none is necessary for a ratification of such an
instrument. This is the case notwithstanding the presence of a
surplusage seal,28 and such an instrument may "be ratified by
the principal by any writing, acts or words which would be suf-
ficient to confirm a simple contract .... ,M4
IIl. ImPLmD RATmCATION
A principal, upon receiving information of an act committed
without authority in his behalf by one purporting to act as his
agent, is not bound unless he ratifies it. Generally, however, the
courts will not permit the purported principal, after maintain-
ing silence beyond a reasonable time, to ratify what develops into
a profitable transaction or to repudiate if otherwise.2 5 "[U]nder
such circumstances the principal will be held to have ratified the
unauthorized act of the agent .... ,126 Accordingly, the law is
firmly established in South Carolina that an unauthorized act
may be impliedly ratified by the purported principal's silence,
acquiescence, or failure to repudiate.27
21. State v. Spartanburg & Union R.R, 8 S.C. 129, 170 (1874).
22. McGahan v. National Bank, 156 U.S. 218 (1895).
23. State v. Spartanburg & Union R.R., 8 S.C. 129 (1874).
24. Id. at 170.
25. Foxworth v. Murchison Nat'l Bank, 136 S.C. 458, 134 S.E. 428 (1926).
26. Id. at 469, 134 S.E. at 431.
27. E.g., Hinson v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924) ; Moyer v. East
Shore Terminal Co., 41 S.C. 300, 19 S.E. 651 (1894); State v. Spartanburg &
Union R.R., 8 S.C. 129 (1874).
1967]
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As previously explained, implied ratification embodies two
classes of cases. The first to be explored concerns inconsistent
conduct on the part of the purported principal reflected by his
acceptance or retention of property resulting from the act in
question. This form of implied ratification is clearly recognized
in South Carolina28 and is, perhaps best illustrated by the case
of Mortgage & Acceptance Corporation v. Stewart.29 In that
case the defendant, Stewart, borrowed money to purchase an
automobile. According to the terms of the mortgage contract, the
defendant was to make the payments directly to the holder of the
mortgage, the plaintiff. Apparently in ignorance of this provi-
sion, however, Stewart made the payments to the automobile
agency from which he purchased the car. The agency received
all of the payments but forwarded less than that number to the
plaintiff. The court, in absolving Stewart of any further finan-
cial obligation, held that the acceptance of benefits by the plain-
tiff from the automobile agency resulted in the automobile
agency becoming the plaintiff's implied agent, and payment to
the automobile agency was payment to the plaintiff-principal.
"They cannot retain these benefits and deny the very conse-
quences of the agency"30 for "with the benefits [they accept] also
the liabilities and burdens resulting therefrom."3 1
In the second class of implied ratification cases, the purported
principal is not a recipient of property, but his conduct never-
theless indicates confirmation of the agent's act. In Betkea v.
Beaufort County Lumber Company,32 the silence or acquiescence
of the wife, with full knowledge that her husband in two in-
stances had acted for her in extensions of timber contracts, con-
stituted an implied ratification.
In the instant case, the wife admits that she knew her hus-
band got the interest money and for an extension, and that
he accepted and used it. The wife's testimony beyond cavil
28. E.g., Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 124 S.E.2d 602
(1962); Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960); Dubuque
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E.2d 8 (1951) ; Associated
Seed Growers v. South Carolina Packing Corp., 186 S.C. 118, 195 S.E. 107
(1938).
29. 142 S.C. 375, 140 S.E. 804 (1927).
30. Id. at 379, 140 S.E. at 805; see Barber v. Carolina Auto Sales, 236
S.C. 594, 115 S.E.2d 291 (1960); Powell v. Easley, 213 S.C. 574, 50 S.E.2d
921 (1948) ; Cook v. C.I.T. Corp., 191 S.C. 440, 4 S.E.2d 801 (1939).
31. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp. v. Stewart, 142 S.C. 375, 380, 140 S.E.
804, 805 (1927), quoting 2 C.J. Agency § 114, at 494 (1915).
32. 111 S.C. 97, 96 S.E. 717 (1918).
[Vol. 19
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concludes her present right. It is plain that with full knowl-
edge of what her husband had done, and the effect of his
doing it, she thereby ratified his act.
38
Parenthetically it should be noted that Bethea, in addition to
providing a classic example of this particular form of implied
ratification, also illustrates the comparative ease with which a
court can find ratification when dealing with a strong kindred
relationship such as husband and wife.
8 4
Just as the purported principal's conduct in the Bethea situa-
tion was held to be an implied ratification, the principal's con-
duct in judicial proceedings may constitute an implied ratifica-
tion.
There is affirmance if the purported principal, with
knowledge of the facts, in an action in which the third per-
son or the purported agent is an adverse party:
(a) brings suit to enforce promises which were part of the
unauthorized transaction or to secure interests which were
the fruit of such transaction and to which he would be en-
titled only if the act had been authorized;
(b) bases a defense upon the unauthorized transaction as
though it were authorized; or
(c) continues to maintain such suit or base such defense.86
The bringing of a suit or the basing of a defense constitutes an
election by the principal which once made cannot be retracted.86
Often, in cases where the issue of implied ratification by
silence, acquiescence, or failure to repudiate is present, another
question arises: How long must the purported principal remain
silent before his conduct effects a ratification? In Foxworth v.
Murchison Nationa Bank,37 the court indicated the necessity for
a flexible standard, one that would allow a determination on the
particular facts of the case in question. "[U]pon being informed
that its agent had gone beyond what it now claims was his
authority, it was [the principal's] duty within a reasonable time
either to ratify or disclaim the action of its agent.... This is
33. Id. at 105-06, 96 S.E. at 719.
34. Bethea v. Beaufort County Lumber Co., 111 S.C. 97, 96 S.E. 717 (1918);
see 2 CJ.S. Agency § 23(a) (1936).
35. RESTATENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 97 (1958).
36. Miles v. Gadsden, 139 S.C. 52, 137 S.E. 204 (1927) ; Stoney v. Schultz,
1 Hill Eq. 465 (S.C. 1834).
37. 136 S.C. 458, 134 S.E. 428 (1926).
1967] AGENcy
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based upon elementary principles of good conscience and fair
dealing. 3 18 The delay found to be unreasonable in Foxworth
was a period of less than two months.
IV. EFFE T oF RATFCATION
Obviously, "[i]f the [agent's] act [is] within the scope of the
agency, and [is] done by the agent while exercising those powers,
there [is] no necessity for ratification."3 9 Ratification relates to
prior acts which did not bind the principal but which were done
or professedly done in his behalf. However, "a subsequent rati-
fication is equal to a previous command"40 and is as binding on
the principal as if in the first instance he had entered into the
transaction in question or authorized someone else to do so for
him.4' This means that the affirmance once made, if not void-
able for fraud, duress, illegality, or lack of capacity, and if not
avoidable by the principal for lack of knowledge or a similar
cause, cannot be withdrawn by either party.42 In Breithaupt v.
Thurnond4 the court stated that
after the [principal] assents to the contract, and offers to
perform everything which his supposed agent had under-
taken he shall do, it is too late for the defendant to disclaim
the contract on the ground that it was originally not bind-
ing on the plaintiff. For at the time he makes the objection,
it is the contract of both the plaintiff and the defendant in
law, and binding on them.
44
The same result is reached whether the principal seeks to with-
draw from an express or an implied ratification.
45
The principal, upon discovering an unauthorized act com-
mitted in his name, frequently attempts to affirm only a part of
it. Generally he will seek to ratify only the provisions benefi-
38. Id. at 469, 134 S.E. at 431 (emphasis added) ; see United Timber Corp. v.
Mullins Lumber Co., 142 S.C. 477, 141 S.E. 15 (1927).
39. Sparkman v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 57 S.C. 16,
34, 35 S.E. 391, 397 (1900); accord, Gantt v. Belk-Simpson Co., 172 S.C. 353,
174 S.E. 1 (1934); Mann v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 S.C. 193, 129 S.E. 79
(1925).
40. Bethea v. Beaufort County Lumber Co., 111 S.C. 97, 105, 96 S.E. 717,
719 (1918).
41. Hinson v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924).
42. RE TATEmNxT (SncoNm) OF AGwcY § 102 (1958).
43. 3 Rich. L. 216 (S.C. 1832).
44. Id. at 219.
45. Sirrine v. C. E. Graham Trust Fund, 136 S.C. 448, 134 S.E. 415 (1926).
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cial to him, to make the ratification conditional upon his suffer-
ing no loss, or to accept the transaction but to reject the repre-
sentations employed by the agent in executing the agreement.
In both express and implied ratification, however, the principal
cannot "ratify that part of the contract which is advantageous
to [him] and repudiate that which is burdensome. If the [prin-
cipal] ratifies in part, [he] ratifies the whole." 46 This prohibi-
tion of a ratification in part is generally applied in cases in
which the purported agent has executed a single transaction.
When the purported agent has entered into several independent
transactions, a ratification of one would not in and of itself
represent a complete ratification of all the transactions.
The principal also cannot make the ratification conditional
upon his suffering no loss and "a principal who ratifies the
unauthorized act of his agent also ratifies his representations and
warranties, as well as other instrumentalities employed by the
agent as an inducement to the action of the third person involved
in the unauthorized transaction." 47
V. RIGHT OF Tnmn PARTY To WITHDRAw
In previous sections attention was directed to the conduct on
the part of the purported principal that may constitute confir-
mation of the agent's unauthorized act. In those sections, in an
effort to avoid confusion, the assumption was made that the
third party had expressed no objection to being bound to the
transaction. It is significant to mention now that to effect a
ratification it is imperative that the affirming conduct occur
prior to a communication to either the purported principal or
agent by the third party of his intention not to be a party to the
transaction. 48 The relationship of the third party to the princi-
pal before the principal's ratification is identical to that of an
offeror to an offeree.49 Accordingly, the third party is free to
withdraw for any reason before the affirmance occurs.5 ° In the
46. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. WRNO, Inc., 216 S.C. 533, 535, 59
S.E.2d 146, 147 (1950); accord, Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240
S.C. 75, 124 S.E2d 602 (1962); Armour Fertilizer Works v. Burckhalter,
141 S.C. 232, 139 S.E. 465 (1927).
47. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. WRNO, Inc., 216 S.C. 533, 536, 59
S.E.2d 146, 147 (1950), quoting 2 C.J.S. Agency § 66 (1936).
48. RFSTATmExT (SEcoNm) oF AGENcY § 88 (1958).
49. Id., comment a at 226; see Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Ebert, 199 S.C. 5, 18
S.E.2d 584 (1942).
50. See Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Ebert, 199 S.C. 5, 18 S.E2d 584 (1942).
1967]
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very early case of Brethaupt v. Thurmond51 the South Carolina
Supreme Court stated: "[I]f, before [the purported principal]
had assented to it, [the third party] had refused to abide by it,
he could not have been compelled to do so."'52
The court in Masonic Temple v. Ebert5 8 had occasion to
reinforce this principle. In that case, the corporate plaintiff
through its agent negotiated the sale of property to the defend-
ant. Because the property constituted substantially all of the
corporation's assets, in order to consummate the sale it was neces-
sary for the stockholders of the plaintiff to meet and approve
the contract. During the negotiations the defendant was told of
the necessity for stockholder ratification. Before the stockhold-
ers met, however, the defendant both informed the plaintiff's
attorney that he did not wish to continue and stopped payment
on the check given as part payment and earnest money. Subse-
quently, the stockholders met and approved the contract, and the
corporate plaintiff sought to specifically enforce it. The court
denied the action on the grounds that the defendant had clearly
withdrawn prior to the attempted ratification. The defendant
had written the corporation, had verbally expressed his unwil-
lingness to proceed with the transaction to the plaintiff's agent,
and had withheld payment on his check. The court concluded
that a valid withdrawal could be effected either expressly or
impliedly and that any one of the defendant's acts was suffi-
cient to accomplish withdrawal. 54 While Masonic Temple did
not involve an unauthorized act by the agent, the court, by
way of dictum, cites with approval numerous authorities which
cogently endorse the proposition that in order to constitute a
ratification affirmance by the principal must precede the third
party's withdrawal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the doctrine of ratification was accepted by our
courts at an early date, its elaboration continues today. The
underlying objective of the doctrine is to find a contract when-
ever it is reasonably possible to do so and in so doing to stabilize
the positions of the purported principal and the third party. In
a word, ratification achieves a result based on principles of
51. 3 Rich. L. 216 (S.C. 1832).
52. Id. at 219 (dictum) (emphasis added).
53. 199 S.C. 5, 18 S.E.2d 584 (1942).
54. Id.
[Vol. 19
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equity and fair play. Assertion of ratification simply requires
the allegation of facts sufficient to raise the issue" as "it is well
established that it is not necessary that ratification . . . be
pleaded."56 If ratification can not be established, other doctrines
such as adoption, restitution, or novation may be availing.
It is submitted that the doctrine of ratification has not been
employed in all instances when applicable. Possibly too much
focus on whether the initial contract by itself is valid coupled
with an unfamiliarity with many of the possibilities of this
doctrine account for this situation.
ARTHm GREGoRy
55. Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960) ; Walker v. Peake,
153 S.C. 257, 276, 150 S.E. 756, 763 (1929).
56. Walker v. Peake, 153 S.C. 257, 150 S.E. 756 (1929).
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